// EDUCATIONAL SAMPLE — FOR LEARNING PURPOSES ONLY

UK LEVEL 7 — MSC / POSTGRADUATE



Cyber Security Case Study: Ransomware Breach Analysis and Incident Response at SecureFlow Technologies Ltd

// Attack Vector: Spear Phishing → Lateral Movement → Data Exfiltration → Encryption

MODULE CODE	CSC5005
MODULE TITLE	Cyber Security
ACADEMIC LEVEL	UK Level 7 (MSc / Postgraduate)
TARGET GRADE	Distinction — 70%+
WORD COUNT	Approximately 1,200 words (excl. figures & references)
FRAMEWORKS APPLIED	Cyber Kill Chain | NIST SP 800-61r2 | MITRE ATT&CK | Zero Trust
COMPLIANCE	GDPR Articles 33/34 | UK Cyber Essentials | ICO Enforcement
REFERENCING STYLE	Harvard (UK)
DATE	July 2026
PREPARED BY	AssignProSolution.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS

```
# Approx. 1,200 words | Distinction Level | UK Level 7 | Kill Chain · NIST IR · ATT&CK · Zero Trust
```

1. INTRODUCTION AND INCIDENT OVERVIEW

On 14 March 2025 at 02:17 UTC, **SecureFlow Technologies Ltd** (fictitious) — a UK-based fintech company processing £4.2 billion in annual payment transactions and holding personal data of approximately 340,000 customers — suffered a critical ransomware incident subsequently attributed to the threat actor group *DarkNexus* (fictitious). Within six hours of the initial foothold, the attackers had traversed the internal network, exfiltrated an estimated 47 GB of customer financial records to external infrastructure, and deployed LockBit-variant encryption across 23 production servers. This case study critically analyses the attack using the Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain (Hutchins et al., 2011) and MITRE ATT&CK framework (MITRE, 2024), evaluates the organisation's incident response against NIST SP 800-61r2 (NIST, 2012), and recommends strategic security architecture improvements.

2. ATTACK ANATOMY: CYBER KILL CHAIN ANALYSIS

FIGURE 1 — CYBER KILL CHAIN ANALYSIS: SecureFlow Ransomware Incident (Fictitious)



Source: Author's original design. Kill Chain adapted from Hutchins et al. (2011). ATT&CK technique IDs from MITRE (2024). All incident data fictitious.

Figure 1: Cyber Kill Chain analysis of the SecureFlow ransomware incident across all seven phases (Hutchins et al., 2011), with corresponding MITRE ATT&CK technique IDs (MITRE, 2024). All incident data, techniques, and timelines are fictitious for educational illustration.

The attack progressed from **Reconnaissance** — OSINT harvesting of executive email addresses via LinkedIn and passive scanning of SecureFlow's internet-facing attack surface using Shodan (MITRE T1591, T1596) — through to a spear-phishing email impersonating a trusted invoice supplier, which exploited CVE-2021-40444, a critical MSHTML remote code execution vulnerability (CVSS 8.8) that remained unpatched on the CFO's workstation. This single unpatched endpoint became the initial access point for a six-hour attack campaign that terminated in double-extortion ransomware: exfiltrate then encrypt (Verizon, 2024).

3. VULNERABILITY ROOT-CAUSE ANALYSIS

Table 1: SecureFlow Vulnerability Register — Root-Cause Analysis (Fictitious). Risk severity rated using CVSS v3.1 Base Score and likelihood × impact matrix (NIST SP 800-30).

Vulnerability	MITRE ATT&CK	Root Cause	CVSS / Severity	Consequence in Incident
Unpatched CVE-2021-40444 (MSHTML RCE)	**T1203**	**No automated patch management; 47-day patch lag on endpoint estate**	**8.8 — Critical**	**Initial code execution on CFO workstation — primary foothold**
Absent MFA on privileged accounts	T1078	Single-factor AD authentication; no MFA enforcement policy	**High**	Stolen domain admin credentials enabled unrestricted lateral movement
Flat network — no micro-segmentation	T1021	Legacy flat LAN design; no east-west traffic inspection	**High**	Attacker traversed from workstation to domain controller to all 23 servers unimpeded
Backup servers reachable from production VLAN	T1490	Backups not isolated in separate network segment; no immutable storage	**High**	LockBit encrypted online backups, preventing immediate recovery
Insufficient email filtering (no sandboxing)	T1566.001	Gateway lacks dynamic macro detonation sandbox; SPF/DKIM not enforced	**Medium**	Weaponised Excel attachment delivered undetected to CFO inbox
No SIEM / EDR with behavioural detection	T1055	Signature-based AV only; no endpoint detection and response tooling	**Medium**	Cobalt Strike beacon operated undetected for 4 hours before manual discovery

Anderson's (2020) layered defence model — defence-in-depth — holds that no single control should be solely responsible for preventing a breach. SecureFlow's incident illustrates a cascading failure across *six* independent control layers simultaneously, each of which would have been sufficient individually to disrupt the attack at an earlier Kill Chain phase. The unpatched MSHTML vulnerability is operationally representative: Verizon's (2024) Data Breach Investigations Report

identifies unpatched known vulnerabilities as the initial access vector in 28% of ransomware incidents, underscoring that patch management remains a foundational, non-negotiable control.

4. INCIDENT RESPONSE: NIST SP 800-61R2

NIST SP 800-61r2 (NIST, 2012) structures incident response across four phases — Preparation, Detection and Analysis, Containment, Eradication and Recovery, and Post-Incident Activity. SecureFlow's response is assessed against each:

Preparation was critically deficient: the organisation had no formally documented Incident Response Plan (IRP), no pre-designated Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT), and no breach notification contact list for the ICO. NIST (2012) explicitly identifies IRP absence as the single most significant amplifier of breach impact — without pre-agreed authority delegations and decision trees, responders improvised under crisis conditions, losing an estimated 90 minutes of containment time.

Detection and Analysis occurred only when a systems administrator manually noticed anomalous WMI execution processes during a routine early-morning check — four hours after C2 establishment. Had a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system correlated the initial PowerShell download cradle (T1059.001), C2 beaconing pattern, and subsequent WMI lateral movement (T1047), automated alerting would have detected the attack within minutes of the installation phase (NCSC, 2022).

Containment was reactive rather than surgical: the SOC isolated all 23 production servers simultaneously, triggering a 19-hour complete service outage. A tiered network segmentation architecture would have enabled selective containment — isolating compromised hosts whilst preserving unaffected services.

SIEM Rule (Sigma format) — Detection rule for Cobalt Strike beacon pattern (illustrative)

```
# Sigma rule: Cobalt Strike staged download via PowerShell
title: Cobalt Strike PowerShell Download Cradle
status: experimental
logsource:
    category: process_creation
```

```
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'powershell'
            - 'DownloadString'
            - 'IEX'          # Invoke-Expression — common C2 stager
    condition: selection
falsepositives: ['Legitimate admin tooling — verify with asset owner']
level: high                 # ATT&CK T1059.001 — PowerShell
```

5. LEGAL AND REGULATORY OBLIGATIONS

The breach triggered obligations under two GDPR articles. **Article 33** required SecureFlow to notify the ICO within 72 hours of becoming aware of the breach — a deadline the organisation missed by 31 hours, submitting notification 103 hours post-discovery. The late notification, combined with evidence that the patching failure had persisted for 47 days, placed the organisation in a materially worse position for the ICO's enforcement assessment. The ICO's (2023) published enforcement decisions demonstrate that timely notification, cooperation, and evidence of pre-existing corrective action are the primary mitigating factors in fine calculation under Article 83(4), with maximum penalties reaching 2% of global annual turnover for Article 33 failures.

Article 34 additionally required direct notification to the 340,000 affected data subjects, given that exfiltrated records included payment card data and national insurance numbers — categories whose exposure meets the 'high risk' threshold for mandatory communication. The failure to implement UK Cyber Essentials controls — specifically patch management and multi-factor authentication — further exposed SecureFlow to reputational consequences, as Cyber Essentials certification is a contractual requirement for several of its government payment-processing contracts (UK Government, 2021).

6. STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

The incident analysis converges on a single architectural conclusion: SecureFlow's security posture was built on implicit perimeter trust — the assumption that internal network traffic was safe. This assumption is structurally incompatible with modern threat actor capability. The strategic response must therefore adopt a **Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA)** (NIST SP 800-207, 2020; NCSC, 2021) as its organising principle: never trust, always verify.

// PRIORITY REMEDIATION ROADMAP

- **Immediate (0–30 days):** Deploy MFA (FIDO2 hardware keys) on all privileged accounts and enforce via Conditional Access policies. Patch CVE backlog using a risk-tiered patching SLA (CVSS ≥7.0 within 14 days; ≥4.0 within 30 days). Isolate backup infrastructure in an air-gapped or immutable storage tier (e.g., AWS S3 Object Lock or offline tape rotation) per the 3-2-1-1-0 backup rule.
- **Short-term (30–90 days):** Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) tooling with behavioural analytics to replace signature-based AV. Implement a SIEM with UEBA (User and Entity Behaviour Analytics) and the Sigma rule library, onboarding all critical log sources including Active Directory, DNS, and email gateway. Introduce email sandbox detonation for macro-bearing attachments and enforce DMARC/DKIM/SPF to prevent sender spoofing (T1566.001).
- **Strategic (90–180 days):** Implement network micro-segmentation using software-defined networking, creating isolated VLANs for each business function with deny-by-default east-west ACLs — so that even a fully compromised endpoint cannot reach a domain controller or production database directly. Commission a penetration test and purple team exercise against the ATT&CK framework to validate control effectiveness before declaring readiness (Shostack, 2014).
- **Governance:** Draft, test, and rehearse an Incident Response Plan with a defined CSIRT, authority matrix, and ICO contact workflow — so that Article 33's 72-hour notification window is met by process, not heroics. Achieve Cyber Essentials Plus certification within 6 months to restore government contract eligibility and provide independent validation of baseline controls (UK Government, 2021).

Anderson (2020, p. 14) observes that security failures are almost never the result of a single unknown vulnerability but of known vulnerabilities left unaddressed due to resource prioritisation failures. SecureFlow's incident validates this precisely. The organisation possessed the technical knowledge and vendor guidance to address every one of the six root-cause vulnerabilities identified in Table 1 — the failure was governance and prioritisation. A Zero Trust architecture, rigorously implemented and continuously tested, would have interdicted this attack at the Installation phase at the latest, before exfiltration or encryption occurred, limiting the incident to a contained workstation compromise rather than a catastrophic enterprise breach.

REFERENCES

Anderson, R. (2020) *Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems*. 3rd edn. Chichester: Wiley.

Hutchins, E.M., Cloppert, M.J. and Amin, R.M. (2011) 'Intelligence-driven computer network defense informed by analysis of adversary campaigns and intrusion kill chains', in *Proceedings of the 6th Annual International Conference on Information Warfare and Security*. Reading: Academic Publishing International, pp. 113–125.

ICO (Information Commissioner's Office) (2023) *Breach Notification under the UK GDPR*. Available at: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/uk-gdpr-guidance-and-resources/personal-data-breaches/personal-data-breaches-a-guide/ (Accessed: 15 July 2026).

MITRE (2024) *MITRE ATT&CK® Enterprise Matrix*. Available at: https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/ (Accessed: 15 July 2026).

NCSC (National Cyber Security Centre) (2021) *Zero Trust Architecture Design Principles*. Available at: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/zero-trust-architecture-design-principles (Accessed: 15 July 2026).

NCSC (2022) *Ransomware, Extortion and the Cyber Crime Ecosystem*. Available at: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/whitepaper/ransomware-extortion-and-the-cyber-crime-ecosystem (Accessed: 15 July 2026).

NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) (2012) *SP 800-61r2: Computer Security Incident Handling Guide*. Gaithersburg, MD: NIST. Available at: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-61r2 (Accessed: 15 July 2026).

NIST (2020) *SP 800-207: Zero Trust Architecture*. Gaithersburg, MD: NIST. Available at: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-207 (Accessed: 15 July 2026).

NIST (2021) *SP 800-30r1: Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments*. Gaithersburg, MD: NIST.

Shostack, A. (2014) *Threat Modeling: Designing for Security*. Indianapolis, IN: Wiley.

Stallings, W. (2019) *Cryptography and Network Security: Principles and Practice*. 7th edn. Harlow: Pearson.

UK Government (2021) *Cyber Essentials Scheme: Overview*. Available at: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/cyberessentials/overview (Accessed: 15 July 2026).

Verizon (2024) *2024 Data Breach Investigations Report*. Available at: https://www.verizon.com/business/resources/reports/dbir/ (Accessed: 15 July 2026).